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SARS legacy: outbreak reporting is expected and respected
On March 15, 2003, WHO declared that the new 
disease it called severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) was a worldwide health threat. The disease 
emerged in late 2002, when an outbreak of atypical 
pneumonia began in Guangdong Province, China. It 
subsequently spread across the world via major air 
routes, reaching 29 countries on fi ve continents. This 
international spread began when a doctor who had 
treated patients in China arrived in Hong Kong on 
Feb 21, 2003. His 1-day stay in a hotel led to infection 
of 15 others who carried the infection to hospitals 
within Hong Kong and in Vietnam, Canada, Singapore, 
the USA, the Philippines, and Australia. This rapid 
international spread prompted WHO to issue the fi rst 
global alert on March 12. 3 days later, a Singaporean 
doctor who had treated some of the fi rst patients 
in Singapore developed symptoms while attending 
a medical conference in New York, USA. During his 
return journey, he was quarantined and admitted to 
hospital in Frankfurt, Germany. The causative agent 
was unknown at that time.1
SARS was the fi rst severe and readily transmissible 
new disease to emerge in the 21st century. Three 
factors led to intense discussions between senior WHO 
epidemiologists and the agency’s Director-General: 
that the disease had emerged in southern China, an 
area from which many epidemiologists expected the 
next infl uenza pandemic to originate; that it caused 
outbreaks of a severe unidentifi ed atypical pneumonia 
with respiratory failure within Asia and was spreading 
to North America and Europe; and fi nally that hospital 
workers particularly seemed to be at risk. But questions 
of the unknown dominated the discussions, not these 
facts. Was the syndrome caused by an infectious agent? 
If it was infectious, would it spread from health workers 
to their families and communities, or had it already done 
so? Were there asymptomatic infections? Could it sustain 
transmission indefi nitely, and could it become endemic 
in people or become enzootic in animals leading to a 
constant threat of re-emergence in human beings?
With the rapidity of spread by international air travel, 
WHO issued a rare travel advisory. This decision, made 
on March 15, 2003, is now public health history; WHO 
developed a case defi nition on the basis of existing 
evidence and the world was alerted again just 3 days 
after the initial warning.2 The unprecedented global 
solidarity that followed allowed early and real-time 
sharing of information and evidence by telephone, 
video, and the internet. The disease was spreading 
by face-to-face contact, probably through coughing 
and sneezing and possibly by fomites. Antivirals 
and antibiotics were not curative. Through a virtual 
network of laboratories coordinated by WHO with 
teleconferences and secure websites, the causative 
agent was identifi ed as a novel coronavirus on March 22, 
2003, and a diagnostic test was quickly developed.3,4
Transmission outside China occurred in waves—from 
individuals initially infected in Hong Kong to hospital 
workers, from hospital workers to family members, 
and from family mem bers to other close contacts in 
the community. For a respiratory disease, SARS was 
unusual in that trans mission was low in the fi rst 5 days 
of illness and peaked with increasing disease severity. 
This pattern of transmission allowed the disease to be 
contained by public health measures alone. However, 
the fact that transmissibility was greatest when illness 
was most severe contributed to the high proportion of 
secondary infections in health workers, who accounted 
for 1706 (21%) of 8096 cases reported.2 The remaining 
infections occurred in chains of transmission from 
household and community contacts.2
The most notable and exceptional event was the out-
break in an apartment complex in Hong Kong, where 
more than 300 residents were infected, many without 
having had obvious face-to-face contact with each other. 
There was concern about a possible environmental 
factor in transmission.2 Precautionary measures were 
applied, with WHO recommending that people postpone 
travel to Hong Kong and other areas where outbreaks 
were occurring and contract tracing was not linking 
cases. Airport arrivals in Hong Kong in May, 2003 fell by 
68% and hotel occupancy by 78% compared with the 
same period 1 year earlier.5 Similar negative eff ects were 
also reported in Singapore, Vietnam, Taiwan, China, and 
elsewhere in Asia, contributing to an estimated short-
term loss of US$30 billion.
The international response to SARS was coordinated 
by WHO from its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, 
and from the Western Pacifi c Regional Offi  ce in Manila, 
Philippines, with the assistance of WHO country offi  ces 












780 www.thelancet.com   Vol 381   March 9, 2013
and from the Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network and its constituent partners.6 Ultimately, 
control of the course of the outbreak was the result of 
concerted multisectoral eff orts, and by use of established 
tenets of disease control, such as safe infection-control 
practices in health-care settings, early case detection and 
isolation of patients, tracing and quarantining of SARS 
contacts, rapid dissemination of infor mation, and raising 
of public awareness about risks.7
The new disease was transmitted from person to 
person for about 8 months and then disappeared after 
an unprecedented level of international co operation 
and collaboration. By July 5, 2003, WHO was able to 
declare that “all known chains of person-to-person 
trans mission of the SARS coronavirus” had been 
broken.7 Whether SARS would have become endemic in 
people or in an animal reservoir without this determined 
global health response will never be known. One clear 
lesson that emerged from the outbreak, however, was 
that inadequate surveillance and response capacity in 
one country can endanger not only its population, but 
also global public health security.8
As happened with smallpox—another disease that has 
disappeared from people—later cases did occur because 
of laboratory accidents. Additionally, investigation in 
the emergence of SARS identifi ed small mammals sold 
for human consumption within live animal markets in 
Guangdong, China, as a milieu in which coronaviruses 
can be amplifi ed and repeatedly cross the species barrier 
to human beings. Four cases of SARS were reported 
from Guangdong between December, 2003, and 
January, 2004; at least some patients were thought to 
have been to live animal markets.9 But the virus that had 
spread around the world earlier in 2003 seemed to have 
a mutation, with an important 29 base-pair deletion 
in ORF8 that created a novel genetic sublineage.10 This 
deletion was absent in virus isolates from civets and in 
the later four human cases.10
Perhaps the most important legacy of the SARS out-
break resulted from the courage of the WHO Director-
General, Gro Harlem Brundtland. Concerned about 
delays in offi  cial reporting and ineff ective outbreak 
contain ment that led to the global outbreak, she 
publicly accused a WHO Member State of placing the 
world at risk.11 Offi  cial reporting and eff ective national 
outbreak control followed, and, in what became per-
haps the greatest legacy of SARS, disease reporting 
changed almost overnight from being approached 
with hesitancy and preoccupation with concern about 
the potential economic fallout from such transparency, 
to something that was simply expected and respected. 
This development was enshrined in an international 
agree ment after the World Health Assembly—concerned 
about the emergence and rapid spread of SARS—urged 
WHO to give high priority to the work on the revision of 
the International Health Regulations “using experiences, 
know ledge, and learning acquired during the SARS 
response”.12 4 years later, in 2007, the new International 
Health Regulations (IHR 2005)13 came into force and 
now provide the legal framework with which reporting 
and risk assessments for public health emergencies of 
international concern are required.
Now, countries are expected to report unusual and 
unexplained outbreaks of disease despite any poten-
tial economic eff ects, and reporting is respected inter-
nationally. The fi rst cases of severe human pneu monia 
caused by infl uenza A (H5N1)—detected and reported 
in Vietnam and Thailand between late 2003, and early 
2004—were probably identifi ed partly because of 
enhanced alertness after the SARS outbreak, and led 
to the recognition and reporting of disease in poultry. 
Human infections with infl uenza A (H5N1) virus continue 
to be reported, despite severe and often uncompensated 
culling and decreased travel, trade, and tourism.
Reporting expectations were clearly demonstrated by 
the emergence of another novel coronavirus in Saudi 
Arabia in 2012. Under the framework of the IHR 2005, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan—countries where people 
infected with this novel virus lived—worked together 
with other countries where patients had been admitted 
to hospital, such as the UK and Germany, and with a 
global network of laboratories and WHO to review the 
available evidence and assess and communicate the risk 
globally to help prevent an irrational response.14 New 
laboratory tests are being developed. Recent evidence 
of limited person-to-person transmission of this same 
novel coronavirus in the UK from an index case who 
seemed to have acquired the infection in the Middle 
East has heightened concern about the potential of 
this newly identifi ed virus. WHO has communicated 
the urgency for enhanced and proactive surveillance 
of severe acute respiratory infections, and patients 
with severe pneumonia should be investigated with 
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history. Both well and sick contacts of confi rmed cases 
should also be intensively investigated.
As with several other viral infections (eg, Nipah 
and Hendra viruses), bats have been identifi ed as 
the probable animal reservoir from which the SARS 
coronavirus originally emerged. This fi nding has 
led to additional research on viruses carried by bats 
and rodents; such information was useful when the 
novel coronavirus was fi rst detected in 2012, because 
it is a close genetic relative of bat viruses.15 Indeed, 
investigations have shown that phylogenetically related 
viruses occur widely in some insectivorous bat species, 
indicating that these viruses originated in bats.16
Emerging infectious disease outbreaks all emphasise 
the need for collaboration between organisations 
respon sible for human health, animal health, and 
the environment. The notion behind collaborative 
eff ects of several disciplines to attain the best possible 
health for people, animals, and the environment 
needs to gain more traction. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization, the World Health Organization for 
Animals, and WHO are sharing responsibilities and 
coordinating activities to assess risks at the interface 
between people, animals and the ecosystem, and 
providing leadership in this arena.17
The 10 years since SARS emerged have made a diff er-
ence. The IHR 2005 enshrine the expectation that 
public health emergencies of international concern 
be reported and managed in a way that respects the 
countries that report promptly. Rapid and sensitive 
molecular diag nostic tests are being developed, 
deployed, and used. There is now an improved 
aware ness of the importance of zoonotic threats 
from wildlife and domestic animals. Therefore, all 
countries can attain the ultimate goal of the IHR 2005: 
development of public health capacity to detect and 
respond to diseases when and where they occur.
In the late 1990s, WHO developed a vision for global 
heath security as a world on the alert and ready to 
respond rapidly—both locally and globally—to threats 
from emerging infections. The SARS outbreak and the 
IHR 2005 have helped to move the world closer to this 
vision with a new mantra—one of expectation and 
respect. 10 years after SARS, how the global public health 
and animal health community responds to the newly 
emerging coronavirus threat will be a test of what has 
been achieved and whether the one-health notion can 
move beyond words to practical action.
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